Science, Pseudoscience, and the Colonization of Knowledge: A Defense Against Scientism
In an era where “science” is invoked as a membrane of authority for everything from morality to marketing, we risk forgetting that true scientific rigor has boundaries.
The term “scientism” describes an exaggerated faith in natural science’s ability to resolve all human inquiry, often dismissing philosophy as obsolete. Prominent figures like Sam Harris and Neil deGrasse Tyson have famously marginalized philosophy, yet their stance often relies on unexamined philosophical assumptions—what philosopher Daniel Dennett calls “unexamined philosophical baggage.”
Philosopher of science Massimo Pigliucci argues that scientism is a form of epistemic colonization. It attempts to absorb all rational thought into a monolithic “Science,” ignoring that distinct domains require distinct tools. The belief that science alone wields the authority to answer ethical, metaphysical, or aesthetic questions is a category error. Empirical data informs these fields, but it cannot dictate the values or logical structures that underpin them.
Consider the concept of a “scientific method.” Philosophers agree no single method unifies all sciences; what applies to physics differs vastly from evolutionary biology or historical analysis. Scientism often ignores this nuance, deploying a “verifiability criterion” that haphazardly labels complex humanistic inquiry as “pseudoscience.”
True wisdom lies in recognizing the strengths and limitations of each discipline. Science explains the “how” of the natural world with unparalleled power, but philosophy safeguards the “why” and the “ought.” By respecting these boundaries, we protect the integrity of science and the丰富性 of human understanding.
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