Why We Punish: The Limits of Harsh Retributivism
From deterrence to restorative justice, the moral case for punishing crimes is shaky when we can’t be sure what’s truly deserved.
The Big Question: Why a Criminal Justice System Exists
At its core, the criminal justice system answers one question: Why should the state cause harm to its citizens? Philosophers and lawmakers have offered several justifications. Deterrence claims harsh penalties stop future crimes; rehabilitation argues that treatment reduces recidivism; expressivism sees punishment as a signal of societal values; restorative justice seeks to heal victims and communities; and retributivism insists that offenders deserve suffering in proportion to their wrongdoing. Each theory has supporters and critics, but retributivism—especially in its harshest form—remains the most contested.
What Is Harsh Retributivism?
Harsh retributivism holds that the primary aim of punishment is to give criminals what they deserve, and that serious crimes merit severe, punitive sentences—often decades in prison or even death. The theory relies on three assumptions:
- Free will and moral responsibility—people can make choices that merit blame.
- Retributivism is the correct theory—punishment must be about desert, not utility.
- We know the right matches of crimes and punishments—longer sentences fit more serious offenses.
While many philosophers defend each premise, disagreement is fierce. Some argue that the psychological capacities we have are insufficient for desert; others claim deterrence or rehabilitation better honor victims; still others maintain that even retributivists should shy away from life‑imprisonment unless certainty exists.
The Epistemic Argument: Why Certainty Matters
The epistemic argument against harsh retributivism does not prove the theory false; it shows we cannot be certain it is right. When we intentionally harm others, the burden of justification is high. In everyday life, we calibrate certainty by checking calculations or asking for a second opinion. In philosophy, there is no “deservometer” to settle the debate, so the disagreement among equally capable scholars forces us to lower our confidence.
Because the stakes involve real suffering—especially in punitive prisons—err on the side of caution. The presumption of innocence, proof beyond reasonable doubt in individual trials, and a broader systemic reform toward humane, restorative, and rehabilitative practices are the rational responses.
What the Evidence Tells Us
Empirical studies repeatedly show that harsh punishments do not guarantee lower crime rates. Scandinavian models—Norway’s “comfortable prisons” with strong rehabilitation programs—report recidivism rates well below those in the United States, where long, punitive sentences dominate. Expressivists note that the severity of punishment shapes societal messages: a life‑sentence may signal indifference if the community has shifted toward softer, restorative norms.
Even among retributivists, there is a split: some accept rehabilitation as a component of desert, arguing that offenders must feel guilt before receiving their just deserts. This overlap suggests the line between harsh retributivism and softer alternatives is not as clear‑cut as political rhetoric claims.
Toward a Humane System
Rather than defaulting to the “tough‑on‑crime” narrative, policymakers should weigh the following:
- Acknowledge uncertainty about desert and the appropriate severity of punishment.
- Prioritize rehabilitation and community repair to reduce future victimization.
- Align punishments with societal values, allowing flexibility as norms evolve.
- Reform harsher practices by gradually easing sentences while maintaining clear moral messaging.
These steps respect the dignity of victims, lower overall suffering, and align the system with current scientific findings.
A Call for Caution and Curiosity
Philosophical disagreement is a sign of intellectual health, not weakness. In a world where we can’t run a lab to measure desert, humility is the ethical tool that protects both the innocent and the guilty. By erring on the side of caution, we keep the criminal justice system humane, effective, and true to its purpose: preventing harm while respecting every human’s right to dignity.
Sofia Jeppsson, associate professor of philosophy at Umeå University, explores how uncertainty reshapes the moral foundations of punishment.
Related topics: free will, moral responsibility, restorative justice, Scandinavian prison models.
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